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ABSI'RACT 
While one of the main agricultural policy objectives of formerly planned economies is the 
maximization of agricultural output under a variety of domestic and international constraints, the 
current changes in incentive structures may be having a mitigating impact on environmental 
degradation. Using the case of Poland, we examine the state of current environmental policy and 
how it is affected by the process of transition to a market economy. 
l. Introduction 
The profound changes in formerly planned economies (FPE), including the former Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe and some developing countries, are bringing about an economic transition of 
unprecedented proportions. In the past, these economies were planned in physical terms using 
normative models and a central decision maker (the state). Resources were centrally allocated and 
production decisions made by firms were based on an assortment of prescribed plans, within resource 
and administrative constraints. In the agticultural sector, the closed nature of these economies with 
the state ownership of the means of production generally gave rise to concentrated, often single-firm 
or state enterprise industries, and farms that could not compete internationally. The lack of 
accountability for environmental costs incurred in the production process and state-determined 
incentives on producing high levels of output meant that the firms seldom had to conform to standards 
for effluent and other byproduct discharges. Further, they make inefficient use of natural resources 
as measured by energy per unit value of output (Figure I and Roe 1992). In most of these countries, 
soil and water resources were severely affected by the location and intensity of industrial production 
and by the large-scale projects of drainage, land reclamation, irrigation, and deforestation.' 
The transition to market economies creates many uncertainties and introduces important 
structural adjustments into the economy, particularly as prices are freed from the administrative 
controls and left to the forces of supply and demand (Csaki 1990). Western economists do not have a 
good understanding and certainly no simple recipes for designing efficient and equitable transition 
policies. The transition back from a socialist to a capitalist economy is less well understood than in 
the other direction. The distortions and inefficiencies created by a command and control economic 
organization have been the subject of extensive writing (e.g., Kornai 1980, Stuart 1984). The typical 
transition cases are from undeveloped, feudal, or rural farm economies to a free market economy, 
which is the subject of a lot of the development literature (e.g., Mexico). 
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The move from one stable form of economic system, based on administrative allocation of 
resources, to another one driven by market forces and government policy is by no means obvious: 
major discontinuities occur and adjustments by economic agents (firms and households) talce 
different forms with varying results in the short and long runs. This is most clearly illustrated 
recently by firms reacting to the elimination of subsidies and the freeing of prices; most state-{)wned 
firms have increased prices while very few tried to cut production costs. 
While in transition, the FPEs have an opportunity to design institutions and policies aimed at 
promoting a sustainable agriculture. The central question we address in this paper is whether the 
establishment of market-based incentives is a necessary and sufficient condition to realize important 
gains in environmental quality. First, we review the policy framework facing firms in transition. We 
then discuss incentive structures and firm and household behavior models in FPE. We use the 
example of Poland to evaluate the current and potential environmental impacts of the economic 
transformations taking place, and we conclude with some general observations on the role of 
environmental policy in the transition. 
2. Issues in Environmental Policy in Transition 
Pollution, or environmental degradation in general, is explained in western economic theory as 
"external effects" of production and consumption due to "market failure" or not well-defined 
"property rights" that impose external costs on society (Baumol and Oates 1988). In the FPEs the 
intensification of production for economic (meeting consumer demand) and political (inward-{)riented 
development) reasons has exacerbated the environmental impact. Theoretical! y, in these countries we 
should expect property rights to be well-defined and clearly distributed because all means of 
production and environmental resources belong to the state. The equivalent of a market failure in this 
case could be termed "administration failure," since all market institutions are centrally administered. 
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In western economies, the theory has it that private decision makers have no incentive to 
adequately consider environmental social cost elements in their calculations, even if they are aware of 
them. In FPEs, it appears that the central planning authority, the state, had no incentive to take into 
account environmenUI inputs and/or outputs of economic processes, their wider social consequences,. 
and their full translation into costs and benefits. An interesting question is why this "failure," which 
in a capitalist economy would be attributed to the nonexistence of markets, particularly since it can be 
argued that the socialist state had as its main objective society's welfare. This leads to an interesting 
symmetry in the two economic systems between the roles of public institutions and privatization in the 
generation and internalization of externalities. 
An important feature of these economies, as is now becoming apparent, is that while 
environmental concerns were a societal goal, they were not reflected in the central planner's objective 
function, which was essentially to maximize physical output. The intensification of production turned 
out to be a major incentive for firms to use environmental resources freely, resulting in massive 
environmental degradation. The need to achieve high food production at any cost in Poland and the 
Ukraine resulted in massive land reclamation programs, drainage of wetlands, forest clearing and 
altering of river courses. The procurement price system in the former Soviet Union gave an incentive 
(through bonuses) to state and cooperative farms to farm marginal lands to increase production; this is 
the typical case of a pricing policy that distorted incentives and brought in land not suited for 
production and with it negative environmental impacts. 
The opening of FPEs to market economics has resulted in the short run in massive 
unemployment, high inflation, and a fall in real output. In agriculture, the sharp rise in input prices 
(for energy, chemicals, seeds, and machinery), accompanied by a less rapid increase in commodity 
prices, has resulted in lower yields and planted areas, declining commodity outputs, worsening of the 
terms of trade, and a fall in real farm income. Input prices typically rose two to four times faster 
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than output prices (ERS 1992). In addition, high interest rates and depressed farm income have led to 
a fall in investment for farm production. Manufacturing plants of agricultural inputs are typically 
responding by increasing prices to maintain revenues rather than cutting production cost, a trend that 
should be reversed by privatization. Governments are trying to grapple with the new realities and 
respond with policies aimed at stabilizing farm income (e.g., intervention purchasing in Poland, price 
support in the Ukraine) while trying to address the major questions of privatization of state farms and 
agro-industrial complexes, land development, input and commodity markets, and the realities of 
international markets. 
It is useful to distinguish two phases in the transition: "opening up" and "restructuring." The 
first phase corresponds with the liberalization of the economy, while the second phase corresponds 
with the privatization of state firms and the redistribution of property rights. 
2.1. Opening Up Phase 
The new incentive structures brought about by the opening phase include the freeing of prices, 
eliminating subsidies in input markets and credit, stabilizing prices (control of domestic output 
markets), and eliminating trade restrictions. Few of the changes explicitly address environmental 
uses. If the example of the western free market economies is used as a model for FPEs to emulate, 
then a number of observations can be made. 
First, existing pricing structures are generally not sufficient to bring about a reduction in 
environmental degradation, particularly for water resources, to levels that could be characterized as 
"efficient" and "sustainable." Free market ecooomies are grappling with major soil and water quality 
problems, and market failures are typically the source of the these externalities; Pigouvian taxes 
(Pigou 1960) and the establishment of appropriate property rights (Coase 1920) constitute the 
theoretical foundations for devising institutions to help internalize social costs. As a result of 
responding to the market failures, free market economies are ridden with policy-induced distortions 
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that affect environmental quality. Finally, for agriculture in the FPEs the short-term fall in input use 
may have a beneficial impact on water quality and soil conservation, but the impacts will not be 
lasting and may not even be noticeable, given the accumulated, sometimes irreversible, impacts of 
solid wastes, heavy metals, acid rain, and salinization. 
2.2. Restructuring Phase 
We argue that the definition of new property rights will go a long way toward securing 
important gains in environmental mitigation. When the economy was deregulated, state-owned farms 
responded to decreasing revenue by increasing prices; in some cases where farms were privately or 
cooperatively owned and were in better financial shape, revenue enhancement was achieved through 
savings in production cost and investment in new technologies. 
Because of the massive costs necessary for cleanup,' environmental mitigation could be achieved 
through prevention. In agriculture, incentives that promote best management practices, including 
tillage, rotations, soil testing, conservation practices, contour plowing, terracing, integrated pest 
management, buffer/filter strips, livestock waste disposal practices, casing of drinking water wells, 
household waste disposal systems, and education and extension could go a long way to restricting 
future pollution. These incentives could be in the form. of cost-shared voluntary adoption of any of 
these or other low-cost technologies (CARD 1992). The "Green Lungs of Polandft program is 
another example where entire areas previously not damaged by pollution are being protected and 
promoted for "ecological farming." The success of engaging in a program designed to facilitate 
restructuring with enhanced environmental quality depends on understanding the institutional 
transitions required for fostering appropriate outputs. 
In industry, a combination of command and control approaches' with fmancial incentives like 
credit subsidies could, in the long run, bring pollution to levels similar to those in Western Europe 
and the United States. The cost of direct regulation could be balanced against the cost of subsidies to 
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find the optimal mix of instruments. But the basic idea is that technology standards may be more 
appropriate in cases where specific technologies are known to lead to substantial emission reductions, 
particularly in high risk areas. On the other hand, performance standards will give firms the choice 
to adopt least-cost abatement technologies and induce innovation; they may also help weed out a large 
number of inefficient firms. In either case, standards will have to be phased in over a long period of 
time, given the obsolete state of the production technologies in place, particularly in the industrial 
sector. It can be argued that society would suffer greater welfare losses if standards are required to 
go into effect in a short period of time. Financial incentives could be as taxes on inputs, outputs, or 
emissions and subsidies to promote less polluting technologies and resource conservation. 
3. Incentive Structures in an FPE 
The environmental incentives facing state-owned firms under state planning are determined by 
two important factors, the production objectives and the system of standards and fines, both set by the 
central planner. Given an assortment of targets, constraints on input and resource availability, and 
the wage, management, and price systems, the maximization of physical output provides clear 
incentive for firms to achieve these objectives at any (external) cost. In addition, the combination of 
a system of "high standards" (higher than in the West in many cases) for water and air quality 
(Hughes 1992) and "low fines," typically planned and budgeted in advance by firms, created the 
incentive of "pollute first and then pay." In effect, the central planner exogenously priced resource 
very cheaply, with no relation to their true scarcity, and subsidized firms tO cover the fines, thus 
exacerbating the degradation impacts. More important, this meant that at best firms equated marginal 
cost of abatement to the fine rate, and it is a failure of the central planner to properly reflect the 
marginal damage to society into the fine system. 
It is no surprise that many studies of socialized agriculture by western economists (e.g., Hayami 
and Ruttan 1971; Koopman 1989) found no compelling evidence of static technical and allocative 
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inefficiency in production compared to the West. Technical (static) efficiency is independent of input 
and output prices and is a reflection of the internal organization and incentives for efficient operation 
of socialized farm units. In contrast, these studies conclude that it is the effects of agricultural 
policies and the administrative distribution of inputs that produce economic inefficiencies (many farms 
operated at a loss and did not equate prices and marginal cost and the value of marginal product). 
However, without accounting for the effects of intensity of resource use and pollution output, such 
measures of efficiency distort the measures of economic product. This, of course, is not explicitly 
accounted for in market economies either (see Bartelmus 1989; Cabe and Johnson 1990). Transition 
policies need to address these considerations explicitly. 
4. Finn and Household Behavior in Transition 
Under central planning, highly subsidized prices, low quality of goods, and shortages of certain 
foods combined with the opportunity cost of waiting in lines, gave the impression of constant food 
shortages. In fact, per capita caloric intake in Central Europe and the USSR was very similar to 
Western Europe (Von Witzke and Senauer 1992). With economic reforms, real household incomes 
have significantly declined, and food prices have risen sharply with the removal of consumer food 
subsidies. The slower increase in real incomes and changes in relative prices are likely to lead to 
reduced consumption of nonstaple foods, and reduced demand for goods and services whose prices 
are rising relatively faster and whose demand is more income elastic. The aggregate effects are likely 
to be complex. We suggest a few cban·ges that will have greater effects on the environment. 
For foods, there is likely to be a shift away from consumption of meats (Jensen 1992). 
Artificially low prices for livestock: products have maintained relatively high levels of consumption of 
meat and dairy products. Changes in the composition of food demand, at least in the short run, are 
likely to reduce relative environmental impacts from livestock: production. 
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The demand for other environmental goods (recreation, vacation-related atnenities) is 
generally considered income elastic, and hence is likely to decrease with declines in real incomes. 
Lower incomes reduce consumers' ability to pay for many environmentally-related goods and 
services. 
Slowly rising incomes are an impediment (or a disincentive) to individuals to at least partially 
compensate for the effects of environmental degradation that are directly linked to individual 
consumption (unhealthy residues, contatninated drinking water, disposal of household wastes, indoor 
air pollution, health care, etc.). Faced with the choice of paying higher costs for goods and services, 
consumers are unlikely to place pressure on local and federal governments to pursue policies that seek 
to mitigate the ill-health effects from the production and consumption of ozone depleting gases, sulfur 
dioxide, and particulate matter suspension, and the toxic effects of effluent discharges of industrial 
processes. This pressure on local and national governments may come, instead, only through 
international lending organizations, standards imposed by trading partners, and donors of assistance. 
5. The Case or Poland 
Poland is of particular interest because it opted for a "shock therapy" transition by moving into 
the opening up phase immediately (since 1989/90) and not gradually as many other FPEs are doing. 
Prices were completely freed, subsidies removed, and the Polish currency (Zloty) made totally 
convertible at market-determined exchange rates. It is therefore one of the few countries where some 
data are becoming available after three years of transition. In addition, the restructuring phase has 
also been initiated by putting in place a process of privatizing state enterprises.• 
In 1990 (Central Statistics Office 1992), Poland had a population of 38.2 million (38 percent 
rural, 62 percent urban) distributed in 49 Vovoidships (provinces) and living on 323,000 Ian'. 
Annual rainfall ranged between 500 mm and 1,000 mm with an average close to 600 mm. Total 
employment in the economy was 16.5 million with 26.8 percent in agriculture. Agriculture's share of 
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Total Net Material Product (GDP) was equal to 15.1 percent. Total planted land to agriculture was 
14.2 million hectares and total forest area was 8.7 million hectares. Figure 2 clearly shows the 
decline in economic activity since the reforms started, and compares the Polish situation to other 
Central European countries. By 1990, Poland's Consumer Price Index was 35,748 and the Index of 
Average Monthly Nominal Wage was 42,198 suggesting that on average, wages may have kept up 
with the price increases. 
5.1. The Structure or Polish Agriculture 
Polish agriculture is characterized by two types of firms. One involves relatively small farms (3 
to 25 hectares with an average of 6 hectares) with mixed enterprises, family owned and operated and 
comprising close to 80 percent of all agricultural land. The second involves state and collective farms 
with about 19 percent of the land (about 3.5 million hectares). Table I gives the general structure of 
agricultural production and the associated yields. 
With the launching of the economic transfonnation program in January 1990, Polish farmers 
experienced a rapid transition from a heavily subsidized agriculture to one devoid of internal supports 
and offering little protection against international competition (U.S. Embassy-Warsaw 1992). 
The first important economic impacts of the transition in Poland are clear in the worsening of 
the terms of trade since 1989 (Table 2). 
Production of most agricultural commodities is projected to decline in 1992/93. Area planted is 
down and yields are projected to fall due to lower input use and to drought conditions. Beef and 
dairy output are also expected to decline. Processing industries (mostly state-owned) are in some 
financial difficulty and unable to reliably obtain agricultural input products. This is expected to result 
in higher imports of processed foods, except for the meat processing industry (ERS 1992). 
The precipitous fall in real agricultural prices and the deterioration of the financial situation, 
particularly of the 2,000 state farms, have prompted the introduction of some measures to protect 
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domestic production (agricultural duties went from 8 percent to 18 percent) and to support farm 
income. To dampen the free fall of farm income, preferential credits have been provided by the 
government to purchase fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, breeding animals, land, investment in land, and 
food production using "ecological methods." In 1990, the Agency for Agricultural Market (ARR) . 
was created to conduct intervention by purchasing (grain, mille, beef, and sugar) credit guarantees and 
minimum prices. 
5.2. Agricultural Inputs 
Removing price controls and reducing state subsidies has changed relative prices between inputs 
and outputs and has led to the fall in production levels and restructuring of agricultural production. 
Between 1988 and 1991, fertilizer prices increased 50 to 100 times but crop prices rose much more 
modestly (ERS 1992). Using the example of phosphate and selected agricultural commodities, Table 
3 gives changes in relative prices that occurred between 1988 and 1991. 
As a result of increased prices, the aggregate use of nitrogen (N), phosphate (P,O,), and potash 
(K20) fertilizers went from 3.9 million tons to less than 2 million tons during the same period. The 
change is clearly reflected in application rates (average kilograms per hectare of N,P, K) as presented 
in Tables 4 and 5. And, as with fertilizers, pesticide use sharply decreased due to a 22-fold increase 
in prices in 1990; pesticide prices increased faster than crop prices. Table 6 summarizes the change 
in the price of the pesticide afalon relative to important commodities, and shows the decrease in 
application rates between 1989 and 1991; overall, active ingredient use declined 72 percent over the 
same period. 
Other input prices have also increased. For example, machinery prices increased 3 to 5 times 
faster relative to livestock: and crop prices; tractor prices increased by a factor of 20 to 40. The price 
of coal increased 160-fold; and the price of diesel fuel increased 67-fold between 1988 and 1992. 
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5.3. Resources and the Environment 
Poland has accumulated very severe pollution problems due primarily to high coal use, old 
technology, and low energy prices. The average consumption of coal per person in Poland was 
almost 900 kilograms of coal-equivalent for 1989, compared with less than 50 kilograms of coal-
equivalent for the European Community. In addition, energy prices (using an average index) were 60 
percent lower in Poland than in the European Community (Hughes 1992). 
The environmental damage in Poland stems in large part from the concentration of sources in 
some of the most populated regions. For example, 50 percent of airborne pollution originates from 
15 percent of the total areas in south and southwest Poland; in these areas the maximum 24-hour 
ambient concentration of black: smoke exceeds the European Community standard more than six-fold. 
The Katowice Province has 12 percent of the Polish population and is responsible for about one-fifth 
of all soot and dust and more than one-third of solid waste; just three mines producing 10 percent of 
coal output are responsible for 20 percent of the 30 million cubic meters of saline water and brine 
discharged daily as a byproduct from coal mining, rendering most of the main rivers, the Visrula and 
the Odra, too corrosive even for industrial consumption (World Bank 1992). Heavy concentration of 
industry and power plants in a few provinces (especially near the headwaters of the Visrula and Odra) 
and a number of major cities is responsible for further water pollution. River self-purification is low 
because of the flatness of the terrain and the slow flow stream (Hughes 1992). 
Water Resources. Sources of water pollution include industrial enterprises and municipal 
sewage in urban areas, agricultural runoff and sewage in rural areas. More than a third of sewage in 
Poland continues to be discharged without any treatment and for another third, there is only primary 
(mechanical) treatment. It is estimated that 40 percent of rivers are polluted by physical-chemical 
elements and that 78 percent of rivers are polluted with biological elements (coliform count and 
sanitary conditions). Out of 39 major lakes, 23 are classified as over-polluted by Polish standards 
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(Central Statistics Office, Warsaw 1992). An estimated 33 percent of sewage flows into surface 
waters (rivers and lakes). 
In the village, the backbone of Polish agriculture, water quality is rated very low in 20percent 
of household water supply systems, 48 percent of common wells, and 66 percent of home wells. This 
results in 50 percent of the village population being adversely affected by nitro-compounds and 
bacteria. In addition, it is estimated that between 1987 and 1989 only 29 percent of villages had 
active water supply network:s, 5.3 percent had sewage systems, and 2 percent had water purification 
plants (Central Statistic Office, Warsaw 1992). It is also estimated that about 11 percent of the 
country area inhabited by about 35 percent of Polish population is in the ecological hazard category. 
Overall, an estimated 65 percent of Polish surface waters are considered to be unfit even for industrial 
use (Table 7); this highlights the need for immediate water conservation policies to reverse the current 
degradation trends. In the long run, the policy focus would then shift to best management practices, 
education, and institution building. 
Soil Resources. Two important categories of soils can be found in Poland: podzodic, or 
brown eanh, comprising 82 percent of total agricultural land, and clay and organic soil comprising 9 
percent of total agricultural land. In addition, sandy soils are generally in areas with high water 
tables. Poland has adopted a classification of land by value class similar to the one used by the U.S. 
Soil Conservation Service {fable 8). A large amount of land is threatened by water erosion. 
Estimates of agricultural land threatened by erosion are summarized in Table 9 (Central Statistics 
Office, Warsaw 1992). 
5.4. Environmental Policy 
The government of Poland is moving aggressively on pollution. On November 19, 1990, the 
Economic Committee of the Polish Council of Ministers (U.S. Embassy Warsaw 1992) approved a 
National Environmental Policy. It is the first of its k:ind to be issued in the countries of Eastern 
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Europe now undergoing economic transformation. The short-term goals of the policy are: (I) 
closing or restricting the 80 worst enterprises in Poland and an additional 500 plants to be identified 
by the Vovoidships (provinces), (2) increasing the size of the coal washing program; (3) improving 
drinking water supplies for urban areas; (4) cleaning up the Baltic Sea shore; (5) preventing extreme. 
air pollution in large urban areas through use of low sulfur fuels, and changing automobile traffic 
planning; (6) introducing more stringent motor vehicle standards; (7) improving environmental 
collaboration with neighboring states; (8) constructing regional centers to handle toxic and hazardous 
wastes; (9) establishing a food certification system and implementing food quality standards; and 
(10) implementing an intensive afforestation program (World Bank 1992). 
Experts qualify the plan as ambitious and too costly to be successful. A recent World Bank 
report (1992) recommends that since cleanup of hazardous waste and other forms of liquid and solid 
waste is extremely expensive, only immediate risk to human health sites should be considered for 
cleaning and that attention should be given to mitigating ongoing pollution and preventing future 
pollution. Indeed, the cost of the proposed policy in Poland is estimated at U.S. $200 billion over the 
next 25 to 30 years. Pollution abatement will eastover U.S. $70 billion (excluding industrial and 
energy restructuring), 75 percent of which is earmarked for water protection and 15 percent for air 
quality management. 
By 1991, about 1.25 percent of national income went to environmental expenditures, more· than 
double any previous year. Out of the total capital investment, 48.3 percent was earmarked for water 
protection, 20.8 percent for soil protection, and 30.6 percent for air protection. However, such 
investment in environment-related expenditures is not likely to be sustained. And changes in 
allocation of resources toward practices with lower environmental costs are coming about through 
specific punitive regulatory measures. The total amount of fines and renibution for environmental 
contamination covered less than 7 percent of investment. Reduced industrial and agricultural 
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production since 1989 has been accompanied by reduced pollution emissions: air pollution emissions 
may have decreased 15 to 20 percent since 1989, and industrial emissions of water pollution may 
have fallen by about 30 percent (World Bank 1992). 
Water pollution could be improved drastically by improved water allocation through pricing and 
institutional arrangements. The lack of effective regulations and lack of physical infrastructure to 
improve water quality (e.g., sewage and water treatment plants) suggest major changes and 
investment required to protect water quality. Institutional arrangements to guide appropriate 
decisions, such as assignments of property rights consistent with the established environmental goals, 
will be necessary. 
In the short- and medium runs, taking the example of energy and water, the elimination of 
subsidies and establishment of free markets will not bring about equalization of "marginal benefits" 
(to firms) and "marginal damages" (to society). Given the obsolete technology in place, firms, 
particularly state-owned ones, will adjust by raising prices and passing the effect on to consumers and 
there will be only marginal impacts on the environment. 
Technological rigidities (obsolete, inefficient) are such that firms cannot immediately adjust and 
will simply transfer the cost to society. In other words, the firms in FPEs cannot adjust marginally 
like a capitalist firm would, by continually improving technology and cutting cost, but will need to 
adjust structurally, by privatizing, reorganizing production, and investing in new technology, among 
other things, in order to reduce the social cost of environmental damage from agricultural and other 
economic production. 
6. Conclusion 
The transition process in FOEs is characterized by two qualitatively different phases, opening up 
and restructuring. Phase one is characterized by rapid changes as prices are liberated, price controls 
and subsidies are removed, markets are allowed to function and determine the levels of prices and 
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quantities, currencies are made convertible at exchange rates that are determined by market forces, 
and trade is liberalized with the removal of the state monopoly on international commerce, and the 
removal and/or adjustment of tariffs and barriers. The environmental impacts of this phase are 
mixed. On the firms' side, the combined effect of sharp increases in input prices, competitive 
international markets, and obsolete technologies results in most cases in lower production levels and 
consequently lower pollution levels (Figure 2). Reductions in industrial pollution occur as the result 
of the freeing (increasing) of energy prices. Another example is the drastic reduction of fertilizer and 
pesticides in agricultural production. A third example is the impact of freer trade on export goods 
required to conform to technical standards. This opening up phase is having the effect of a tax on 
output aimed at abating pollution by lowering output levels. However, these short-term reductions in 
pollution levels will not be sustained with future growth in production and will most likely have no 
impact on the cumulative damages already in place. Consumers also respond to the incentive 
structures associated with the opening up phase through a tighter budget constraint and reduce 
consumption of certain environmental goods considered to be luxuries. 
Phase two is characterized by slower and more fundamental changes, as the large, inefficient 
state-owned enterprises are restructured and privatized, as property rights are distributed and related 
institutions (banking, legal, etc.) are created to support the proper functioning of free markets. The 
environmental impacts of this phase could be more lasting and should bring FPEs to levels 
comparable to the Western economies in the long run. This environmental adjustment period could 
be shortened considerably if lessons learned in the West and policy instruments found to perform 
successfully are utilized effectively and implemented in new environmental policies (e.g., in Poland 
and Hungary). According to a recent OECD study (French 1991), trends are manifesting themselves 
in the West and appear to mark successful environmental policies: (I) deregulations that move 
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toward reduced direct government intervention in society; (2) a trend toward policy intervention, both 
within the environmental policy field as well as between traditionally separated policy fields; and 
(3) gradual transition from curative to preventive environmental policies. However, even if 
successful, restructuring will not be sufficient for halting environmental degradation because free 
markets will still fail to price resources according to their true scarcity. 
Externalities are the trademark of a capitalist economy. One challenge faced by FPEs, which 
could also be a blessing, is to create innovative approaches to resolve market failures from the outset 
by building institutions to establish, clarify, and completely assign property rights to privatizing state-
owned firms. 
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Table 1. Structure of agricultural production in Poland (1990) 
Basic cereals• 
Wheat 
Rye 
Potatoes 
Sugar beets 
'Include wheat, rye, barley, oats, triticale. 
Table 2. Terms of trade 
Economic variable 1990 
Input prices +900% 
Output prices +400% 
Real farm income -50% 
Real wages of the ·24% 
general population 
Outlays for farm ·30% 
production 
Average land prices 4.4 
(million zltslba) 
Ratio of farm debt to 
final production 
Interest rates 
Production 
(million tons) 
24.1 
9.0 
6.1 
36.3 
16.7 
Table 3. Changes in relative agricultural prices in Poland 
Phospbatelwheat 
Phospbatelrye 
Phospbatelpotatoes 
1991 
+78% 
+30% 
-8% 
+1.5% 
·17% 
7.7 
Yield 
(mt/ha) 
3.32 
3.96 
2.62 
19.8 
38.0 
1992 
17% overall 
62% state farms 
7% private farms 
46·55% 
Change in ratio from 1988 to 1991 
1.0 to 5.0 
1.4 to 8.3 
2.8to12.1 
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Table 4. Changes in fertilizer application rates in Poland 
77-79 87-89 
N+P+K 244 224 
Calcium• 
•Calcium is used to treat acidic soils. 
Table 5. Polish fertilizer consumption in nutrient value 
Farms 
1988 
(lcglha) 
176.4 
202 
1991 
95.1 
139 
1992 (forecast) 
60-70 
Year State Cooperative Private Total· 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
274 
291 
258 
Table 6. Relative prices and use of pesticides 
Afalon'/wbeat 
Afalonlrye 
Afalonlpotatoes 
Price of afalon (zits per kK) 
Active ingredieot use (lcglha) 
Pure ingredient per kilograms per hectare 
261 !55 !82 
280 
257 
1989 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
3,675 ($ .30) 
1.62 
168 
136 
1991 
1.3 
2.2 
3.2 
196 
!64 
126,000 ($ 9.30) 
0.44 
'Afalon is a herbicide used in field crops and vegetables. 
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Table 7. Water purity in Polish rivers 
1967 1977 1983 1987 
Percent of total length monitored 
Class I' 31 10 
Class II" 26 30 
Class IIr 14 27 
Beyond classes" 29 33 
'Suitable for use in municipal water supply. 
'For animal consumption, agriculture, and recreational uses. 
"'ndustrial use. 
'Unfit for industrial use. 
Approximately 15,000 km monitored. 
980 km of Vistula's 1,047 km have no I and II. 
SOURCE: Compiled from USEPA 1990 and French 1991. 
Table 8. Agricultural land classification 
Total I 
(million hectares) 
Arable land and 14.7 .4 
orchards 
Permanent grassland 4.1 0 
Total 18.8 .4 
Note: Class I is highest agricultural value. 
7 5 
28 27 
29 26 
36 42 
Classes 
II ill IV v 
percent 
3.3 24.9 39.1 20.3 
1.5 13.5 42.5 31.3 
2.9 22.3 39.8 27.7 
1991 
65 
VI 
12.0 
11.3 
11.9 
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Table 9. Agricultural and forestland threatened by erosion 
Erosion intensity risk as pe=tage of 
total threatened area 
Million Percentage 
hectares of total Low Modente High 
Wind 8.8 28.2 61.6 34.8 3.6 
Water erosion 
Sheet 8.7 27.9 48.7 38.7 12.6 
Gully 5.7 18.2 2.4 82.3 15.3 
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ENDNOTFS 
1. Some accounts estimate that, in the former Soviet Union, 150 million hectares (about two-thirds 
of arable land) has lost fertility because of wind and water erosion. About 12 percent of irrigated 
farmland is contaminated with salt compounds due to poor drainage systems. Production losses 
attributable to soil erosion in the former Soviet Union were estimated to be about $30 billion 
annually. Also, in the former Soviet Union, the largest body of fresh water in the world, Lake 
Baikal (which contains 80 percent of the country's fresh water supplies), and the Aral Sea, one of 
the largest inland body of waters in the world, have been severely degraded by industrial and 
agricultural practices (French 1991). In Romania, the livestock production complexes (some of 
which contain as many as 300,000 pigs, 20,000 cattle, and more than one million chickens) 
discharge an estimated 125 million cubic meters of wastewater per year, about equivalent to the 
volume of domestic wastewater expected to be discharged from aU .S. city with a population of 
one million. It is estimated that less than 5 percent of these complexes meet effluent standards 
for BOD and two out of five wells in Romania have a concentration of nitrates exceeding the 
allowable standards (Wolf 1992). 
2. For example, in the former Soviet Union, it is estimated that 20 to 30 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product will need to be committed for the next 20 to 30 years to cleanup the environment (French 
1991, World Bank 1992). 
3. For example, technology standards require implementation of specific abatement practices and 
performance standards are aimed at reducing emissions to specified levels. 
4. This is being done in two ways (ERS 1992): the liquidation and sale of assets; or the 
transformation into a one-person company of the state treasury, followed by sale of shares to 
interested domestic or foreign buyers. 
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